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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After being charged with one count of felony domestic battery, one count of attempted
strangulation, one count of felony kidnapping, and one count of aggravated assault, Michanglo
Smith exercised his constitutional right to a jury trial. He was found guilty of felony domestic
battery, misdemeanor assault, and misdemeanor false imprisonment, but the jury was unable to
reach a decision on the attempted strangulation charge. Mr. Smith was re-tried on the attempted
strangulation charge and the jury found him guilty.
On appeal, Mr. Smith contends that in his first trial, the district court erred by admitting
irrelevant and unduly prejudicial evidence of a prior incident between Mr. Smith and a State’s
witness, by denying his motion for a mistrial, by allowing the State to re-open its case-in-chief to
establish an element of the charged offenses; and by admitting irrelevant evidence that Mr. Smith
was sexually propositioned. Mr. Smith also asserts that the district court abused its discretion
during the second trial by allowing one fact witness to provide a medical opinion which was
undisclosed to the defense. Finally, Mr. Smith contends that the district court erred by ordering
$363 in restitution for lost wages.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s contentions that the errors identified
by Mr. Smith in his Appellant’s Brief were harmless.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Smith’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err by admitting irrelevant and overly prejudicial evidence of a prior
encounter between Mr. Smith and a State’s witness?

II.

Did the district court err by denying Mr. Smith’s motion for a mistrial?

III.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony of a State’s witness
on the effect of bruising on darker skin where the State did not comply with expert
disclosure requirements?

IV.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by allowing the State to reopen its case-inchief?1

V.

Did the district court err by admitting irrelevant testimony recounting an incident in
which a stranger sexually propositioned Mr. Smith?

VI.

Did the district court err by ordering $363 in restitution for Ms. Cole’s lost wages?

1

Mr. Smith fully briefed Issues IV-VI in his Appellant’s Brief, as incorporated herein, and the
State’s arguments do not merit further discussion.
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Admitting Irrelevant And Overly Prejudicial Evidence Of A Prior
Encounter Between Mr. Smith And A State’s Witness
The State claims “the evidence [of the past encounter between Mr. Smith and Mr. Apker]
was relevant to establish the relationship and familiarity between Apker and Smith, which was
critical to the state’s theory of the case.” (Resp. Br., p.11.) However, the State’s theory of the
case was not that Mr. Smith and Barry Apker2 were in an altercation resulting in criminal
charges being filed. Mr. Smith was accused of conduct relating to Ms. Cole, not Mr. Apker.
Thus, the prior contact or relationship between Mr. Smith and Mr. Apker was irrelevant to what
happened to Ms. Cole.
After the prosecutor asked Mr. Apker several questions regarding the portion of their text
exchange referring to an incident occurring several months prior, whereby Mr. Smith came into
Ms. Cole’s place of work, defense counsel twice asserted a relevance objection to the
prosecutor’s line of questioning. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.416, Ls.3-7; p.428, L.2 – p.429, L.10.) The
prosecutor then asked Mr. Apker what Mr. Smith said to him during their prior encounter, and
Mr. Apker responded that Mr. Smith “apologized for harassing, calling the store, trying to get
ahold of her, and bothering the place of business.” (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p. 428, L.2 – p.430, L.5.)
Thereafter, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, asserting that the evidence was irrelevant and
was more prejudicial than probative under I.R.E. 403. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.431, L.15 – p.434,
L.5.)

2

Barry Apker was one of Ms. Cole’s managers at Jack-in-the-Box. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.202, L.25
- p.203, L.24.)
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In ruling on the mistrial motion, the district court analyzed the challenged testimony
pursuant to I.R.E. 401, 403, and 404(b), stating the following:
Essentially, the defense is requesting a mistrial under 401 and 403 because the
basis stated was irrelevant, and even if it is relevant, it’s unduly prejudicial. The
defense did not cite 404(b) as a basis, but I think that this evidence also goes into
the realm of 404(b).
It is important to note in all of the motions in limine, in all of the Court’s pretrial
orders, none of them actually addressed Mr. Apker’s testimony. And so his
testimony is not the basis of the Court’s rulings in its orders in limine.
...
So the question is, is the testimony about this prior incident relevant? Relevancy,
under 401 makes it whether any question of fact has a tendency to make a fact
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
The evidence that is in the record at this point from Ms. Cole is that on the
evening of the 27th during the drive-about, Mr. Smith stopped at that Jack-in-theBox location and entered the store. And that would have been during the time
frame that some of these communications were occurring.
Additionally, the question is would Mr. Apker have recognized the defendant had
he actually came into the store. And so based on that, I do find that the prior
introduction of Mr. Smith to Mr. Apker is relevant for purposes of identity.
Because otherwise, how would he have known if he had been in the store or not if
he had not ever met him?
So the issue about the prior incident and the relay of harassment, there is
sufficient basis in the evidence for the Court to determine that the prior incident
actually did happen based on the testimony at trial so far.
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.434, L.2 - p.435, L.17.) When the jury returned, the district court gave a
limiting instruction, telling the jurors that Mr. Apker’s testimony about their prior meeting was
not to prove that the defendant had a disposition to commit crimes or bad acts. (Trial Tr. Vol. I,
p.441, L.15 – p.442, L.6; Aug., p.15.) The district court instructed the jury that it was “not to
consider Mr. Apker’s testimony about the frequency or purposes of telephone calls to the store
prior to January 27th of 2018.” (Aug. p.15.)
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The State asserts that the evidence was relevant to establish the relationship between
Apker and Smith, “and to provide context for the reference to this encounter in the admitted text
messages.” (Resp. Br., p.12.) However, the context surrounding Mr. Smith’s text messages to
Mr. Apker does not establish that Mr. Smith struck or attempted to strangle Ms. Cole.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as “evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” I.R.E. 401. Even though
evidence might not be material to a disputed issue, such evidence may still be relevant if it is
probative and material. State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, ___, 462 P.3d 1125, 1135 (2020).
In this case, Mr. Apker’s testimony was not probative or material where Mr. Smith’s
identity was not at issue—Mr. Apker testified that he was not in the store when Mr. Smith came
in on January 27, 2018. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.430, Ls.12-14.) Because Mr. Apker was not present
when Mr. Smith went to Ms. Cole’s place of work on the night of the 27th (Trial Tr. Vol. I,
p.430, Ls.12-14), there was no reason for the prosecutor to ask Mr. Apker whether he could
identify Mr. Smith or to ask him to recount Mr. Smith’s first visit to the workplace and the
alleged prior misconduct. Nor was Mr. Smith’s physical identity germane to the text messages,
because the text messages themselves contained statements by Mr. Smith identifying himself as
Ms. Cole’s boyfriend/fiancé.

(State’s Exhs. 30A-30D.)

Further, Mr. Apker was not an

eyewitness who had observed Mr. Smith and Ms. Cole’s altercation—his knowledge of
Mr. Smith’s appearance was not relevant.

Accordingly, the evidence that Mr. Apker had

previously spoken to Mr. Smith in person was not probative or material to any issue.
The State also asserts that, even if the evidence was irrelevant, the error was harmless.
(Resp. Br., pp.12-14.) The State acknowledged “a limiting instruction alone cannot always
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prevent an error from prejudicing the defendant.” (Resp. Br., p.13.) The State claims that the
error was harmless in this case because the appellate courts have, historically, only cited to this
principle in cases of “a defendant’s prior sexual misconduct with children, or instructions that
were inherently flawed in some way.” (Resp. Br., p.13.) However, a finding that a limiting
instruction cannot always prevent a prejudicial error is not limited to only the circumstances
described by the State.

The State describes the prior interaction between Mr. Smith and

Mr. Apker as “benign prior contact.” (Resp. Br., p.14.) However, Mr. Apker did not describe
“benign prior conduct.” He testified that Mr. Smith called the restaurant multiple times after
which he came in and “apologized for harassing, calling the store, trying to get ahold of
[Ms. Cole], and bothering the place of business.” (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.428, L.2 – p.430, L.5.)
Further, the State’s argument that this error was harmless “in light of the evidence of
Smith’s guilt” (Resp. Br., p.14) is controverted by the Idaho Supreme Court’s recent explanation
of “harmless error” in Garcia,
First, we reiterate that the proper showing for “harmless error” is not
“overwhelming evidence” of the defendant's guilt. Chapman v. California makes
clear this is not the correct standard. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23, 87 S.Ct. 824.
Harmless error is “error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury
considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.” Yates, 500 U.S. at
403, 111 S.Ct. 1884. Proper application of the Yates two-part test requires
weighing the probative force of the record as a whole while excluding the
erroneous evidence and at the same time comparing it against the probative force
of the error. Id. at 404, 111 S.Ct. 1884. When the effect of the error is minimal
compared to the probative force of the record establishing guilt “beyond a
reasonable doubt” without the error, it can be said that the error did not contribute
to the verdict rendered and is therefore harmless. Id. at 404–05, 111 S.Ct. 1884.
While a reviewing court might quantify the probative force of the record as a
whole as “overwhelming evidence” of guilt, as we did in State v. Montgomery,
163 Idaho at 46, 408 P.3d at 44, the probative force of the error must be weighed
as well. To rely on the “overwhelming evidence” standard is to commit the same
mistake the United States Supreme Court overturned in Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824.
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Garcia, 462 P.3d at 1138-39 (emphasis in original). In this case, by eliciting the information
from Mr. Apker at the outset of the trial, the prosecutor was able to set the stage for her theory of
the case. By introducing evidence at the beginning of trial that Mr. Smith had engaged in
harassment and confrontation at Ms. Cole’s workplace, the jury would conclude that Mr. Smith’s
aggressive behavior in the past made it more likely that he confronted and ultimately injured
Ms. Cole.

II.
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Smith’s Motion For A Mistrial
The State claims that a mistrial was not warranted because the jury would have reached
the same verdicts absent any error. (Resp. Br., p.15.) However, when viewed in the context of
the full record, the district court’s refusal to declare a mistrial after the district court admitted
irrelevant and overly prejudicial information regarding the prior harassing behavior of Mr. Smith
constituted reversible error.
Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1 provides, “[a] mistrial may be declared on motion of the
defendant when there occurs during the trial, either inside or outside the courtroom, an error or
legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct that is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the
defendant of a fair trial.”

I.C.R. 29.2(a).

The Idaho Supreme Court has described the

appropriate review of a district court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial as,
[N]ot whether the trial judge reasonably exercised his discretion in light of
circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was made. Rather, the question
must be whether the event which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented
reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record. Thus, where a
motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the “abuse of discretion”
standard is a misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated, is one of reversible
error. Our focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that
triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to declare a mistrial will be
disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible error.
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State v. Johnson, 163 Idaho 412, 421 (2018) (quoting State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908,
912 (2003).)
In this case, the prosecutor elicited irrelevant and prejudicial testimony that continuously
affected the trial. The admission of this evidence tended to work great, and ongoing, prejudice
on Mr. Smith’s case, as this evidence necessarily would tend to imply that he had tendency to
engage in jealous or harassing behavior where Ms. Cole was concerned. It allowed the State to
portray Mr. Smith as a person who engaged in inappropriate conduct in the past, as well as one
who created problems for Ms. Cole, which was unfairly prejudicial to Mr. Smith’s defense.
Information that there had been prior incidences of harassing behavior perpetrated by
Mr. Smith against Ms. Cole was before the jury and the information continuously impacted the
trial. The prosecutor’s pattern of asking the questions regarding Mr. Smith’s prior bad conduct
was extremely prejudicial. Later in the trial, the prosecutor again elicited propensity evidence
over the objections of the defense. As Mr. Smith described in Section V of his Appellant’s Brief,
the prosecutor, after re-opening her case, improperly elicited irrelevant testimony from Detective
Wigington about Mr. Smith’s discussion of a three-way sexual experience, which required
another limiting instruction.

(App. Br., pp.25-27.)

The prosecutor’s pattern of eliciting

testimony regarding bad acts by Mr. Smith continuously impacted the trial to Mr. Smith’s
detriment. At what point do multiple curative instructions to the jury telling them to disregard
evidence of the defendant’s prior bad acts fall on deaf ears? The district court’s refusal to
declare a mistrial constituted reversible error. See Johnson, 163 Idaho at 421.
The multiple curative instructions cautioning the jury not to consider Mr. Smith’s past
bad acts did not cure the harm and most certainly contributed to the verdict. (Trial Tr. Vol.
I, p.441, L.15 – p.442, L.6; p.838, L.19; p.839, L.5; p.839, L.18 – p.840, L.2.) Detective
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Wigington’s testimony that a stranger in a bar asked Mr. Smith if he would be interested in
participating in sexual activity with her and Ms. Cole was irrelevant as it did not establish a
dating or sexual relationship between Ms. Cole and Mr. Smith and served only to further
besmirch Mr. Smith’s character. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.838, L.21 – p.839, L.8.) Thus, there was an
“overwhelming probability that the jury [was] unable to follow the court’s instructions and a
strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence [was] devastating to the defendant.” State v.
Ruiz, 159 Idaho 722, 724-25 (Ct. App. 2015).

III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing The State’s Fact Witness To Proffer
Opinion Testimony On The Effect Of Bruising On Darker Skin, Where The State Did Not
Disclose The Witness As An Expert Witness As Required By I.C.R. 16
The State asserts that, even if the district court erred by admitting evidence that dark skin
is less likely to show bruising, such error was harmless.

(Resp. Br., pp.20-22.)

This is

inaccurate where the first jury hung on the attempted strangulation charge, because they heard no
evidence that Ms. Cole had any bruises on her. Under the Idaho Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Garcia, a reviewing court considers not just the “the probative force of the record
establishing guilt,” but “the probative force of the error must be weighed as well.” 462 P.3d at
1138-39 (emphasis in original). The State’s assertion that “Wardle’s testimony about the impact
of human skin tone on bruising was a small part of Wardle’s testimony about the observed and
reported physical signs and symptoms of attempted strangulation observed by Wardle and
reported by Cole,” but the State only identified signs or symptoms that would not manifest as a
physical injury visible in photographs. (Resp. Br., p.21.) The lack of bruising or marking on
Ms. Cole’s neck was a critical issue during the second trial on the single count of attempted
strangulation.
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The lack of marks on Ms. Cole’s neck was the divisive issue for the jury during the first
trial, and the jury failed to reach a unanimous decision on the attempted strangulation charge.
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.962, Ls.2-4; R., p.187.) As the prosecutor explained to the district court prior
to the second trial:
[A]fter the jury hung when I was getting feedback from jurors, one of -- they were
all white, I think. Suffice it to say none of the jurors were African-American, and
she indicated that one of the issues were, or a few of the, I guess, hang ups,
holdouts, was that they were not familiar with how African-American skin may
look when it’s injured, or in a state of healing, you know, scarred that, and so for
that reason, I’d ask the court if she could -- let me back up.
(Tr. 3/1/19, p.29, Ls.15-25.)
In an attempt to address the jury’s feedback from the first trial, the prosecution focused
its case-in-chief in the second trial on eliciting and introducing evidence relating to whether
darker skin showed bruising, in order to prove an attempted strangulation occurred. (Trial
Tr. Vol. III, p.28, L.11 - p.77 L.12.) The testimony by the State’s undisclosed expert witness
who told the jury that dark skin such as Ms. Cole’s did not show bruising was pivotal; it
surprised and harmed Mr. Smith’s planned defense that a strangulation did not occur because
there was no bruising on Ms. Coles’ neck. (See Trial Tr. Vol. III, p.72, Ls.22-24.) Because “the
probative force of the error must be weighed,” the admission of a non-expert’s testimony on the
very fact the first jury failed to reach a unanimous consensus on was certainly not harmless error.
See Garcia, 462 P.3d at 1138-39 (emphasis in original).

11

CONCLUSION
Mr. Smith respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions on all counts,
vacate his restitution order, and remand this matter for a new trial.
DATED this 25th day of January, 2021.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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